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Private Placement and Proposed Rule 146
By MARK E. BORTON*
and
ROBERT GORE RIFKIND**

THE primary objective of the Securities Act of 1933 is to provide
investors with full and fair disclosure concerning securities offered

them, so that they are better able to make an informed investment decision.' To accomplish this purpose, section 5 of the act makes it unlawful for any person to offer a security unless a registration statement
has been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),

or for any person to sell a security unless a registration statement for
that security has become effective. 2 The registration statement must
* B.S., 1952, Arizona State University; LL.B., 1957, George Washington University. Member, California and Virginia Bars.
** B.A., 1950, University of California; LL.B., 1954, Harvard University. Member, California Bar.
1. The preamble of the act states its purposes as follows: "To provide full and
fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce
and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, preamble, 48 Stat. 74.
2. Section 5 reads:
"(a) Unless a registration statement is m effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium
of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce,
by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of
sale or for delivery after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
m interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to
any security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this
title, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 10; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce
any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied
or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section
10.
[287]
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contain specified information required by the SEC and, of course, cannot include untrue or misleading statements. 3 The broad requirements
of section 5-that all offers and sales of any security by any person
must be made pursuant to a registration statement-are tempered,
however, by many exemptions from the registration requirements contained in sections 3 and 4 of the act, and also by the artful interpretation of certain definitions contained in section 2 of the act.
One of the most important exemptions from the section 5 registration requirements is the "private offering" exemption contained in section 4(2) for "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."' Typically, a private offering-also known as a private placement-involves an offering to a relatively small number of persons who
are sophisticated in securities transactions, and who generally are able
to bear the financial risks of the investment. The offerees are furnished
detailed information concerning the issuer, either at the time of the
offer or as soon as they express an interest in purchasing the securities,
and also are given access to such other information concerning the
issuer as they may desire. Specific terms of the transaction then are
negotiated.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to
such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or
stop order or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examnation under section 8." Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e

(1970).
3.

Section 7 sets forth the broad statutory requirements of the type of informa-

tion required in a registration statement, and authorizes the SEC to require other information and documents by rules or regulations. Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77g (1970).

Section 10 sets forth the statutory requirements of information required

in a prospectus, and also authorizes the SEC to require additional information by rules
or regulations. Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970). Pursuant to
these statutory provisions, the SEC has adopted Regulation C, 17 C.F.R. § 230.400230.494 (1973). The SEC has also adopted many forms for the registration of particular
types of offerings. Section II imposes civil liabilities where a registration statement con-

tains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact required to
be stated or necessary to make statements made not misleading.

1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).

Securities Act of

Section 24 imposes criminal sanctions on willful

violations of the act or the rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC, and upon

any person who willfully makes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state any material fact required to be stated in a registration statement. Securities Act
of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970).

4. Section 4(2) reads: "The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to-(2)
transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." Securities Act of 1933 §
4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
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In the past, attorneys have felt reasonably comfortable in advising their issuer-clients that if the above procedures were followed,
and if adequate steps were taken to assure that the investors had not
purchased the securities "with a view to distribution," 5 then the section 4(2) exemption from registration would be available. Today,
however, this sense of comfort no longer exists. Perhaps one cause of
the recent uncertainty lies in the fact that the Congressional intent behind the exemption is difficult to determine. Only vague clues as to

the purpose of section 4(2) are supplied by the legislative history of
the act:
[Section 4(2)] exempts transactions by an issuer unless made by
or through an underwriter so as to permit an issuer to make a
specific or isolated sale of its securities to a particular person, but
insisting that if a sale of the issuer's securities should be made
generally to the public6 that that transaction shall come within
the purview of the Act.
At another place m the legislative history, the point is made that
the exemption applies where "there is no practical need for [the application of the registration requirements] or where the public benefits are

too remote."'
These statements, although providing a flavor of the legislative
purpose behind section 4(2), are of little aid to either bench or bar
when attempts are made to define clearly the boundaries of the sec-

tion's applicability. 8 Indeed, the two expressions of legislative intent
5. Until recently, in fact, much of the focus on the availability of the section
4(2) exemption has been on the question of whether the purchaser of the securities
m a private placement is an "underwriter" of the securities as defined in section 2(11)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970), which defines the term underwriter to
mean "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for
an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation
." Thus, if the purm the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking.
chaser takes the securities with a view to distribution, he would be an underwriter as to
those securities, and no exemption from the registration requirements would be available
under section 4. For a discussion of this point, see SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552
(Nov. 6, 1962).
6. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1933).
7. Id. at 5. See also Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1053 (2d Cir.
1969).
8. Generally, judicial interpretations of the private offering exemption can be
found in three types of cases. The first, and most common, is the civil action for
rescission brought under section 12(1) by a purchaser of the stock against the issuer.
That section reads: "Any person who offers or sells a security m violation of section
[5] shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue
either at law or m equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
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contain the seeds of later confusion, for the first expression seems to
indicate that the availability of the exemption depends primarily upon
the number of persons involved, while the second expression seems to
apply the exemption where the investors simply do not need the protection of the act without reference to the number involved. These can
be quite different tests. Of equal import is the fact that the quoted legislative language shows that Congress was thinking in terms of sales of
securities, but the exemption itself was worded in terms of offerings.
In view of the lack of precise defimtion in the statute or in the
legislative history of the term "public offering," it is not surprising
that the development of the exemption has been marked by a fair
While the SEC has broad
degree of uncertainty and confusion.
power under the act to define terms through the adoption of rules and
regulations, it has not as yet defined "public offering" under this power.
This failure to define the term may have been due in part to the SEC's
reluctance to furnish a "loophole" through which securities might, in
fact, be sold to persons needing the protection of the act; and, in
part, to the fact that until relatively recently, the exemption as it stands
has been usable in spite of its inherent ambiguity
As will be discussed in more detail below, however, continued reliance on the exemption under recent court decisions is no longer palatable to careful practitioners, except in rare instances. Yet the importance
of the private placement in the business community cannot be ignored.
Businessmen are issuing billions of dollars worth of stock yearly in private offerings, and by all indications they will continue to do so.'
received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer
owns the security." Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(i) (1970).
Judicial interpretations of section 4(2) will also be found m cases where the SEC

seeks to enjoin an issuer from failing to register. Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970).
A third type of suit involving section 5 violations would be a crunmal action instituted by the Justice Department. Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x
(1970). However, in general, "no criminal proceeding will be brought for failure to
register, absent a showing of fraud or flagrant disregard of the act." Meer, The Private
Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act-A Study in Administrative and

Judicial Contraction,20 Sw. L.J. 503, 509 (1966). Not uncommon, though, are crimmal contempt proceedings brought against an issuer who has allegedly violated an injunction order which prohibited hun from issuing unregistered securities. See, e.g.,
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967); United States
v. Hill, 298 F Supp. 1221 (D. Conn. 1969).

9. In 1972, slightly less than twelve billion dollars of securities were sold in
private placements, an increase of about three billion dollars from the previous year.
INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST, June 5, 1973, at 10.
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While there is no prohibition in the act against registration of private
offerings, there are both practical and theoretical problems with such
registration which virtually compel the use of the exemption. 10 It is
therefore imperative that definitive guidelines be drafted by which businessmen can confidently shape their private offering transactions.
The SEC recently has recognized the need for such definiteness in
section 4(2) transactions. This recognition motivated Proposed Rule
146 which sets out conditions to be met by issuers who desire assurance
that their offerings will be exempt from registration. 1 ' Before examining the Proposed Rule, it may be helpful to examine briefly the status of present case law governing the exemption.
The Four Factor Test
The first extensive consideration of the section 4(2) exemption is
found in a 1935 opinion of the SEC's General Counsel.'" The opinion cited four factors' 8 as relevant in determining whether a particular offering was public or private.
The first, and most important, factor was "the number of offerees
and their relation to each other and to the issuer."1 4 This factor is
partially a statement of a simple "numbers test" under which the sole
criterion used in determining whether an offering is exempt from registration is the number of persons to whom it is made. That is, an offering
to a substantial number of persons is public and, conversely, an offering to an insubstantial number of persons is private.' 5 The opinion by
the SEC's General Counsel made clear, however, that m determining
whether an offering was to a substantialnwnber of offerees, all surround10. As a practical matter, the costs of and time involved in the preparation of
a registration statement are considerable. In addition, if only a few persons purchase
the entire issue registered by a registration statement, these purchasers will likely be
"underwriters" under section 2(11) and will be required to register the shares which
they acquire prior to any redistribution by them. This obviously makes registration
for any offer and sale to a limited number of purchasers appear somewhat futile to
most issuers.
11. Proposed SEC Rule 146, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Rule 146].
12. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
13. Actually, the opinion mentioned six relevant factors since the first factor, as
will be seen, was composed of three elements.
14. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
15. Prior to 1935, there existed a presumption that an offering to less than
twenty five persons was private. Although the General Counsel's Opinion seemed to
abandon ths presumption, not all federal courts have followed suit. See Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F Supp. 104, 111 (D. Minn. 1958).
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mg circumstances were of moment, and the actual number of offerees
was not determinative. 10
Rather, the first factor required that in determining whether a
substantial number of offerees was involved the relation of the offerees
to one another must be considered. Thus an offer made to members of
a defineable group stood a better chance of being labelled "private"
than an offer made to the same number of persons from the general
public.
Additionally, the first factor required that the relation of the offerees to the issuer be considered. In more concrete terms, an offering
to persons who shared a "special knowledge of the issuer" was more
likely to be considered private then an offering to the same number of
persons who did not share such knowledge.
The opimon set out three other factors the SEC considered important to the determination. These were: (1) the number of units
offered, (2) the monetary size of the offering; and (3) the manner of
the offering. 1 7 These factors stressed the notion that an offering of a
small number of umts with a small total dollar value and sold in a
face-to-face transaction was more likely to be private than an offering of many shares with a large total value distributed "through the
use of the machinery of public distribution.' 8
The Ralston Purina Test
In 1953 the United States Supreme Court in SEC v Ralston
Purina Co 1 substantially modified the SEC's four-factor test. Ralston
Punna had sold two million dollars of its stock to hundreds of its employees, but had failed to register the issue. It claimed that the offering
was "private," and therefore entitled to the section 4(2)0 exemption
since it was not made to all Ralston Purina employees, but was limited
to key employees only 21
16. "In no sense is the question [of what constitutes a public offenng] to be
determined exclusively by the number of prospective offerees." SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
17
Id.
18. Id.
19. 346 U.S. 119 (1935).

20.

At the time of Ralston, the private placement exemption was embodied m

section 4(i) of the act.
21. Ralston's definition of key employees, however, included persons in virtually

all ranges of salary and responsibility. For example, the definition included "an Mdividual who is eligible for promotion, an individual who especially influences others or
who advises others, a person whom the employees look to in some special way, an
individual, of course, who carries some special responsibility, who is sympathetic to

January 19741
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The Court rejected Ralston Purna's contention, holding the offering to be public and subject to registration under section 5. In so doing,
it made significant departures from the 1933 opinion of the SEC's
General Counsel.22
First, it adopted the so-called "needs" test for solving section 4(2)
problems. This test requires that all private offerings be examined in
light of the full disclosure objective of the 1933 Act, and that in every
case involving an exemption claim, the court determine "whether the
23
particularclass of persons affected needs the protection of the Act.
The Court noted that "the exemption question turns on the knowledge
of the offerees" 24 and found that the Ralston Purina employees were
"not shown to have access to the kind of information which registration would disclose," 25 and that "[t]he obvious opportunities for pressure and imposition make it advisable that they be entitled to compliance
with § 5."26 It should be noted that this language followed a more
lengthy discussion of employee offerings and a comment that "some
employee offerings may come within § 4(1), e.g., one made to executive personnel who because of their position have access to the same
kind of information that the Act would make available in the form of
27
a registration statement.
The second significant departure from the 1935 opinion of the
SEC's General Counsel involved the numbers test. The SEC suggested
in Ralston that an offering would not qualify as private if it were made
to a "substantial number" of persons, but the Court explicitly rejected
this suggestion, stating: "It may well be that offerings to a substantial number of persons would rarely be exempt . . . .But there is no
warrant for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings as a
matter of statutory interpretation."2 8
management and who is ambitious and who the management feels is likely to be promoted to a greater responsibility." 346 U.S. at 122.
22. Apart from these new inroads, the Court gave its sanction to the requirement
that the issuer in a section 4(2) action must bear the burden of proving that the
offering is private. 346 U.S. at 126. This requirement had been applied consistently
in the lower courts since 1938 when the court in SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co.,
95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938) stated the rationale of the rule as follows: "Being
an exception from the general policy of the act, anyone claiming to be within its

terms has
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

the burden of proof that he belongs to the excepted class ...
346 U.S. at 125 (emphasis added).
Id. at 126.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 125.
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One difficulty with the Ralston Purina case was that, in spite of
its language indicating that the test of a public offering was whether
the offerees had a need for the protection of the registration requirements, the case could be read to mean that the only way an offeree
would not need this protection was if he had access to information
of the type normally found in a registration statement. If this is true,
then possibly the only time the exemption can safely be claimed is
where the offeree is a major executive of the issuer or, perhaps, the issuer's banker, accountant or attorney Other persons, regardless of their
financial sophistication, wealth or ability to analyze the issuer's affairs,
normally do not have access-at the tune of the offer-to the information. This is because of the long-standing interpretation of the
term "offering" as being any attempt to dispose of a security, including
any preliminary conversations for the purpose of ascertaining which of
various possible purchasers would be willing to accept an offer if it
were made to them. Thus, even though an issuer were to grant its
offerees access to information immediately upon their expressing an interest, this access would come too late; the prohibited offer would already have been made.
One question is whether the issuer could overcome this problem
by preparing a "private placement memorandum" consisting of
all information contained in a registration statement and furnishing
this document to all offerees at the time of first contact. As a matter
of practice, this procedure was, and is, followed by many issuers. Unfortunately, this approach presents two major difficulties. First, it
carries an implication that an issuer can choose whether to file a registration statement under the act, or simply to furnish identical information outside of the act and its concomitant liabilities to the issuer and
remedies to the purchaser. Obviously, this would render section 5
of the act meaningless and cannot be allowed.2 9 Second, there is the
strong possibility that the furnishing of information is not equivalent
to having access to information. More particularly, having "access to
information" in the framework of Ralston Purina probably means being
in the class of persons who should have special knowledge of the issuer. This would imply a pre-existing relationship of the offerees to
the issuer. In fact, it seems logical that any offeree to whom the issuer
must furnish registration statement-type disclosure is in that very class
of persons fitting within the Ralston Purina "needs" test.
If Ralston Purinastood only for the broad proposition that the test
29.

See note 49 and accompanying text nfra.
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of a public offering is the need of the offeree for the protection of the
act (and that the number of offerees is not the test), with the "access
to information" language amounting to nothing more than a statement
of how the "needs" test might be met in certain instances, the private
offering exemption would remain viable. If, however, Ralston Purina
stood for the equation of "needs" to "access to information," the exemption was in trouble.
The Post-Ralston Purina Problems
For nearly fifteen years after Ralston Purna, the private offering
exemption was claimed and utilized by issuers with relatively little discomfort. Surprisingly enough, the disavowal of a numbers test in
Ralston Purinawas largely ignored, and the ramifications of the possible interpretation, that offerees must have access to information before
the offering, was generally not a source of great concern. From the
authors' experience, the private offering exemption was generally
claimed so long as (1) the total number of offerees remained below
25 and the actual number of purchasers was somewhat less; (2) all
offerees were furnished financial statements and other registration
statement-type disclosures; and (3) all offerees were financially sophisticated and able to bear the risks of investment. As can be seen, the
first factor was meant to meet a numbers test; the second, to some extent, an access test; and the third, a straight needs test.
However, in 1967, in United States v. Custer Channel Wing
Corp.,30 the Fourth Circuit, in sustaining a criminal contempt conviction for violation of an injujnction against violations of section 5 of the
act, felt that the Supreme Court in Ralston Purnahad
expressed the view that a transaction is exempt when the particular
class of offerees had "access to the same kind of information that
the act would make available in the form of a registration statement." [Citation omitted]. The Court thus made it clear that
only where an offering is "to those who are shown to be able to
may the transaction be deemed a private offend for
31 themselves"
fering.
The Court then noted:
In the present case the District Court found that none of the
purchasers of Channel Wing stock had access to the kind of information that would have become available to them through a
registration statement. Applying the Ralston Purina test to the
sale of Channel Wing securities, it is evident that the transaction
was a public offering.
Appellants argue that the District Court erred in finding that
30.
31.

376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967).
id. at 678.
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the individual purchasers were not able "to fend for themselves,"
noting that they were "sophisticated investors" and "businessmen
of mature experience." But "sophistication" is not a substitute for
"access to the kind of information which registration would dis32
close."

Thus, "access" was clearly equated with the "needs" test. However, it should be noted that the court spoke of purchasers, not offerees, needing "access to information." In other words, Channel
Wing left room for an interpretation that the exemption would be
available where, in fact, an offering was made to only a limited group
of "sophisticated investors" so long as all purchasers were furmshed
"access" prior to their purchases. This application of the "access" requirement to purchasers did not seem unreasonable so long as the test
was not extended to offerees. The major problem with Channel Wing
was simply that the language of the court did not clearly make this distinction.
Where the Fourth Circuit had somewhat muddied the waters in
Channel Wing by equating the "needs" test with the "access" test,
the Tenth Circuit added its own murkiness some four years later in
Lively v Hirschfeld.3 3 The defendants, in an action brought for rescission of sales of unregistered shares,
sought to establish that the offerees had such information and capabilities that the registration statements and disclosures were not
needed by them or would not add anything to what they had available. In their attempt to to this, the defendants examined one of
the plaintiffs at some length, and elicited other testimony relating
of other offerees and their reto the general business knowledge
34
lationship to the defendants.

The court, after discussing the "needs" requirement and equating this
requirement with the "access" test, found that "the offerees are not
such persons of unusual business experience and skill, they did not
have the degree of access to the type of data as would meet the standard."3 5 After a further finding that the one plaintiff who testified as
to his financial sophistication and knowledge of the issuer did not meet
the requirements of the exemption, the court noted:
The standard must apply to all the offerees if the Ralston Purina
case is to be meaningfully applied, and if the artificial classification of "plaintiffs" and the accidental classification of "buyers" is
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
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to be prevented from determining the nature of the offer in a private action such as thus.8 6
With this statement, the "needs" and "access" tests were merged and
coupled with the requirement that all offerees must meet the test.
In Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc.3 7
decided a few months after Lively v. Hirschfeld, the defendants had
induced local investors to incorporate regional franchise sale centers
and then had instructed these original investors in the art of selling
stock in the local franchise center to others. The plaintiffs included
two of the three original incorporators of the local franchise company as well as the other purchasers of the stock of this company. The
action was brought under section 12(1) of the act, 8 which. provides
for recovery by a purchaser of securities offered or sold in violation of
the registration provisions of section 5, and under section 12 ( 2 ),39
which provides a remedy to a purchaser of securities offered or sold
by means of a prospectus or oral commumcation which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact.
In affirming the decision of the lower courts ordering rescission
of the stock sales, the court found that the defendants had omitted to
state material facts to the plaintiffs and were, therefore, liable under
section 12(2). Since, as the court noted, the exemptions found in section 4 are not available to transactions involved in a section 12(2)
cause of action, this aspect of the decision added little to the law of
private placements. The court however, did not rely only on a finding
of a section 12(2) violation, but also found that the plaintiffs could
recover under section 12(1). Since recovery under section 12(1)
requires a violation of section 5, the court went to some lengths to explain why the section 4(2) exemption from section 5 was not available
to the defendants.
In response to defendants' claim that the section 4(2) exemption
was available because the offering had been made only to "sophisticated investors" and that purchasers had access to all the information
they desired, the court replied:
The defendants rely most strongly on the fact that the offering was
made only to sophisticated businessmen and lawyers and not the
average man in the street. Although this evidence is certainly favorable to the defendants, the level of sophistication will not carry
the point. In this context, the relationship between the promoters
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
Securities Act of 1933 § 12(i), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

and the purchasers and the "access to the kind of information
which registration would disclose" become highly relevant factors.
Relying specifically upon the words just quoted from Ralston Purina, the S.E.C. has rejected the position which the defendants
posit here, stating: "The Supreme Court's language does not support the view that the availability of an exemption depends on
the sophistication of the offerees or buyers, rather than their possession of, or access to, information regarding the issuer.
1 Loss, Securities Regulation 657 n.53 (2d ed. 1961)

Obviously

if the plaintiffs did not possess the information requisite for a registration statement, they could not bring their sophisticated knowledge of business affairs to bear 40
in deciding whether or not to invest in this franchise sales center.
With this language, the court not only equated the "access" test with
the "needs" of the offerees, but also provided the rationale for the equation. Any doubt that the court meant this equation was removed by
a footnote which explained that
[t]he definition of a class to which an offer of securities can be
made in reliance on the private offering exemption may, accordingly, be summarized as follows: where the number of offerees is
so limited that they may constitute a class of persons having such
a privileged relationship with the issuer that their present knowledge and facilities for acquiring information about the issuer would
make registration unnecessary
for their protection, then the ex41
emption is available.
The importance of Hill York became more apparent when the
Fifth Circuit decided SEC v Continental Tobacco Co.4 2 In this case
there were apparently 38 offerees of whom 35 ultimately became purchasers. It appears that not all offerees were "sophisticated investors,"
but, instead, Continental had provided most of the offerees with information similar to that which would have been contained in a prospectus had the offering been registered. The court pointed out
that this approach to meeting the "access" test would not be sufficient,
for this would not provide the statutory safeguards and sanctions available through a registered offering. Thus, simply making information
available will not suffice to meet the "access" test. It should be noted
that the court, in fact, found that not all offerees had received the nonstatutory prospectus and that not all purchasers had access to additional
information concerning Continental which they might have required or
requested. In addition, the court could find no testimony or evidence
introduced by Continental that it had made no offers other than those
40. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th
Cir. 1971) (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 688 n.6.
42. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
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described in the evidence entered on behalf of the commission. On the
facts, therefore, the case might have stood for nothing more than the
supposition that Continental had simply failed to carry its burden of
proof as to the availability of the exemption.
Much of the language of the decision, however, raised more farreaching questions as to when the exemption might be available. The
court stated:
The record does not establish that each offeree had a relationship with Continental giving access to the kind of information that registration would have disclosed. The offers of common stock were to dentists, physicians, housewives, and business
other than that of
men, who had no relationship with Continental
43
shareholder once the purchases were made.
The court adopted the footnote definition cited above m the Hill York
case. After finding that one condition of the exemption was met, in
that the purchasers had not acquired the securities with a view to distribution, the court said: "As to the second condition required to be
satisfied for establishment of a privileged relationship between Continental and its offerees and for establishment of the entitlement of
Continental's offering of securities"" the purchasers' acknowledgment
that they had "access" was insufficient to prove that point.
The disturbing fact in this language is not that the furnishing of
information and the acknowledgment of receipt of such information is
insufficient to prove "access," but rather the intimation that some
sort of "privileged relationship" must exist between the issuers and its
offerees.
With the decision in Continental Tobacco, then, there was ample
language to indicate that the exemption might be available only where
all offerees had that "privileged relationship" with the issuer which
would allow them access to the type of information which would otherwise be contained in the registration statement. Nevertheless, it appears that in every case at least some of the purchasers, in fact, had not
had such information made available to them, or that at least the issuer
had failed to prove that all purchasers had received such information or had access to such information. Thus, an optimist might still
have believed that if an offering were made only to a limited number
of "sophisticated investors" and all purchasers were furmished "access
to information" prior to their purchase, the exemption would still be
available. Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit decision in Henderson v.
43.
44.
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Hayden, Stone Inc.,45 rendered on the same day as Continental Tobacco, lessened the chances that this was the case.
Plaintiff, Alex Henderson, III, sought rescission of his $180,000
purchase of 45,000 shares of common stock in Electro-Kinetics Company The defendants were Hayden, Stone, Inc., a major brokerdealer and investment banking firm, Louis W Witt, Jr., Vice President
of Hayden, Stone in charge of its south-eastern region; Richard Perry,
Sales Manager of Hayden, Stone; Sam E. Whittaker, a registered representative employed by Hayden, Stone and Bob E. L. Pope, who was
not employed by Hayden, Stone nor otherwise a broker-dealer in the
securities industry
Pope and Whittaker had entered into an agreement with ElectoKinetics to raise capital for the company in exchange for shares of
stock. Pope and Whittaker contacted Perry to assist them in raising
the needed capital, $300,000. Henderson was a customer of Hayden,
Stone and had counselled Perry concermng a prior investment through
Hayden, Stone, and Perry was aware that Henderson was an active and
substantial investor. Perry, therefore, contacted Henderson, and after
several meetings, Henderson purchased the 45,000 shares of Common
Stock of Electro-Kinetics.
Pope neither offered nor sold stock to anyone; Whittaker offered and sold stock to three persons; Perry sold stock to four persons, but the record did not reveal whether he made additional offers.
Similarly, no evidence was produced as to how many offers Mike Downing (a person involved in the selling effort, but not a codefendant in
the case) tendered. Hayden, Stone and Witt played no part in the
transaction other than being the employers of Perry and Whittaker.
The district court found that the sale to Henderson was not part
of a public offering, and that Perry, Whittaker and Pope were absolved
from liability because of the section 4(2) exemption on the following
grounds:
(1) the number of people involved m this capital venture was
small, and all were sophisticated investors, (2) none of the defendants "solicited for the sale of stock," and (3) the amount of
money invested46by Henderson was small vis-a-vis his total investment portfolio.
The court of appeals, while adopting the district court's memorandum opinmon as to the facts, reversed as to Perry, Whittaker and Pope,
holding that Henderson had established a section 5 violation for which
45.
46.

461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1071.
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recovery is available under section 12(1) of the act. The trial court's
directed verdict in favor of Hayden, Stone and Witt was affirmed on
the grounds that Henderson knew, or had reason to know, that Perry
was not acting as agent for Hayden, Stone in the transaction.
While the cases until Hayden, Stone had been disturbing prmarily because of the reasoning of the courts, and not because of their results, Hayden, Stone was disturbing because of its result. In adopting the district court's memorandum opinion as to the facts, the court
of appeals noted:
The plaintiff testified that he was aware at the time of the transaction that the stock was not registered with either of the above
named Commissions. Henderson has an investment portfolio
which amounts to several million dollars. He is "retired" and
presently, as well as at the time of the transaction, devotes full
time to managing the investments m the portfolio. Prior to his retirement, he was responsible for the investment portfolio of the
loan company which he owned. He has had investment accounts
with the following brokerage houses: Hayden, Stone Incorporated;
Goodbody & Co.; Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.;
Hentz & Co.; Harris Upham & Co., Incorporated, and Laird, Bissel
and Meeds. He has had cash accounts, marginal accounts and
commodities investments accounts. Among the financial publications he reviews are the Value Line Service, Barrons and the Wall
Street Journal. 47Mr. Henderson can only be described as a sophisticated investor.
In addition, Henderson had purchased $180,000 of the entire
$300,000 of stock which was offered and sold, and had had several
meetings with Perry prior to his purchase of the stock. Apparently
there were only seven purchasers of the stock.
In reversing as to Perry, Whittaker and Pope, the court drew four
principles from its earlier Hill York opinion. First, the court noted
that
the state of the evidence leaves it unclear as to the number of offerees involved with this offering.
Secondly, the relationship between the offerees and the issuer is not known. Did the offerees have any knowledge of the
business affairs of Electro-Kinetics? Did they possess the same information as would be found in a registration statement? Did they
have access to such information? Thirdly, we know nothing of the
offerees' relationships among themselves and their knowledge of
no evidence as to the
each other. Finally, the record reveals
48
manner in which the offering was made.
Thus, the court's reasoning added nothing to that previously con47. Id. at 1070-71.
48. Id. at 1071-72.
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tamed in the Hill York and Continental Tobacco Cases. The unusual
aspect of the Hayden, Stone case was that the result was to allow recovery to a person who, under the circumstances, would appear not to
have needed the protection of the act.
The court also met defendants' contention that Henderson personally was not an average, innocent investor and should be estopped
from recovery even if there were a section 5 violation on the grounds
that such a recovery would frustrate the purpose of the Securities Act.
The court noted that despite the act's intention of protecting innocent
investors, recovery would not frustrate the legislative purpose; it would
merely fail to serve that purpose.4 9 It further noted in this connection
that "Congress sought to encourage sellers of securities to register
those securities prior to any sales or offers to sell. By allowing recoveries such as the one m this case, unregistered sales are discouraged."5
There is a temptation to minmize the importance of the three
Fifth Circuit cases by examing each solely on its facts and in isolation
from the others. On this basis, it can be said that Hill York presents a
situation where purchasers were not furmshed material information;
Continental Tobacco presents a situation where there was a large number of purchasers, many of whom may have needed the protection of
the act; and Hayden, Stone presents nothing more than the defendants' failure to carry their burden of proof as to the number and character of offerees. To yield to this temptation, however, may be dangerous. The opinions read together show at least an inclination of the
courts to require that all offerees have that privileged relationship
with the issuer which furishes them access to information which
otherwise would be contained in a registration statement.
In view of the long history of interpretation of the exemption, it
it probably futile to dwell at great length on the strength or weakness
of the logic of the decisions. One might be excused for wishing,
however, that after the Supreme Court's pronouncement of the "needs"
test and disavowal of any "numbers" test in Ralston Purina, that the
courts had given less weight to the criteria set forth in the General Counsel's opinion inasmuch as these criteria were addressed primarily to the
determination of whether a substantial number of offerees was involved.
One might also wish that the courts had not interpreted the Ralston
Purina "needs" test to mean that only "access to information" would
satisfy the test. Had this been done, other criteria, such as financial
49.
50.
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sophistication of the offerees, might have been developed to determine
whether the offerees needed the protection afforded by the disclosure
requirements of the act.
The inevitable result of the present state of the law is uncertainty
for the businessman, and insecurity for the businessman's attorney
who offers advice concerning securities offerings. Undoubtedly, it was
partially because of this uncertainty in section 4(2) law that the SEC
drafted Proposed Rule 146.r1
Proposed Rule 146
At the outset, three points must be made clear concerning the application of Proposed Rule 146. First, it is a suggested alternative only,
and while compliance with it would assure an exemption under section 4
(2), an issuer could obtain the exemption without such compliance if
he has satisfied the criteria set forth in the relevant judicial interpretations.52 Second, it allows the private offering exemption only to issuers, and thus does not apply to purchasers of the unregistered stock
who subsequently resell.53 Finally, in order for the issuer to obtain the
exemption, he must meet all applicable conditions set out below.54
Requirement 1-Manner of Offering, 146(c)

The offer must not be made by means of any form of general advertismg such as newspaper, magazine, radio or television advertisements. Other written commiumcations and seminars and meetings are
similarly prohibited unless all offerees meet the conditions set forth below under "Requirement 2-Nature of Offerees."
In addition to the restrictions on initial contact of offerees, each
offeree, prior to any sale of the offered securities, must be furnished the
opportunity to ask questions of, and receive answers from, the issuer
concerning the terms and conditions of the transaction and the issuer.
In the terminology of the rule, there must be "direct communication"
during the course of the transaction and prior to sale.
51. Rule 146, supra note 11.
52. Courts, however, will often abide by SEC interpretative rules in recognition
of that body's expertise in the securities field. See 3 L. Loss, SECURITmS REGULATION
1930-31 (2d ed. 1961). Thus, the judicial interpretations will probably closely parallel
Proposed Rule 146, and courts will stress its requirements when considering an attempted private offering.
53. Although this limitation is specifically set out in the release accompanying
the proposed Rule, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973), it also appears to be required as a matter of statutory interpretation. By its terms, section 4(2)
applies only to issuers as that term is defined in section 2(4) of the act.
54. Rule 146(b), supra note 11.
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These requirements are in some respect little more than a restatement of the SEC's 1935 position that "transactions which are effected by direct negotiations by the issuer are much more likely to be
non-public than those effected through the use of the machinery of public distributions."5' 5 The major aspect of this provision, however,
would appear to be that there is no limitation on the number of persons to whom the securities may be offered so long as the proper
manner of offering is employed. Thus, the lingering possibility, in
spite of Ralston Purina's disavowal, that the number of offerees would
affect the availability of the section 4(2) exemption has, in the framework of the rule, finally been eliminated.
Reqmrement 2-Nature of Offerees, 146(d)
Prior to the issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, making an
offer, it must have reasonable grounds to believe that the offeree has
such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that
he is capable of evaluating the risks of the prospective investment.
In a pragmatic approach to the realities of private placements, the
rule adopts the concept of an "offeree representative. '56 An offeree
representative is a person who has such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the
risks of the prospective investment and is acknowledged during the
course of the transaction by the offeree to be his representative in connection with evaluating the risks of the prospective investment. Except for very limited situations (primarily involving family relationships) the offeree representative cannot be affiliated with the issuer.5 7
If an offeree representative is involved, his knowledge and experience
can be substituted for, or used in conjunction with, the offeree's knowledge and experience in financial matters. If an offeree representative
is used, however, then the offeree himself must also be a person who is
able to bear the economic risk of the investment. In anticipation of
the very real likelihood that an issuer is apt to make a few mistakes as
to the ability of all offerees and offeree representatives to meet the
sophistication and suitability standards, the availability of the rule will
not be disallowed simply because subsequent inquiry reveals this fact,
if no sale to any such offeree is consummated.
In essence, this provision of the rule sets forth a "sophistication"
test for the offeree and, where the offeree is not sophisticated and em55.
56.
57

SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
Rule 146(a)(1), supra note 11.
Rule 146(a)(1)(i), supra note 11.
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ploys an offeree representative, a "suitability" standard. One trap
which awaits the unwary issuer is that the sophistication and suitability
standards are applied against the particular investment offered; the
rule will apparently not be available simply because the offeree is financially sophisticated and able to bear economic risks. He must be
financially sophisticated and able to bear economic risk in connection
with the particular investment.
With the requirement of financial sophistication, the SEC has reccognized a factor which has been given great weight by practitioners m
spite of the denials by the SEC and the courts of this factor as a criterion
for determining a private offering. While tins factor is not a substitute
for the other requirements of the rule, the validity of the concept of financial sophistication has at least finally been given recogmtion. This
is entirely consistent with the basic Ralston Purina language which
speaks of the "needs" of the offerees for the protection of the act. It
seems almost tautological to say that persons possessing sufficient
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters, so that
they are capable of evaluating the risks of an investment, are less in
need of the protection of the act than persons who are not so endowed.
This requirement seems to be in accord with the basic thrust of the act,
even though disputes will undoubtedly arise in particular cases as to the
application of this requirement.
The concept of "suitability" is common to state regulation of securities in the administration of the "fair, just and equitable" determinations made by many states m approving or disapproving securities
for sale. The concept is alien, however, to the act and its "full and
fair disclosure" philosophy. While one might wish that the SEC had
stayed away from this concept in the proposed rule, experience under
the state statutes and under the "shingle theory" imposed on brokerdealers by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 indicates that the requirement can be met without undue difficulty.
Requirement 3-Access to or Furnishing of Information, 146(e)
During the course of the transaction and prior to the sale, each
offeree (or his offeree representative) must either (a) have access to
the same kind of information required by the act to the extent that the
issuer possesses or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense, or (b) be furnished such information by the issuer. This provision strikes at the very heart of the problems raised by Ralston Purina
and the successor cases as previously discussed.
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The rule recognizes that the required access to or furnishing of
information need only occur during the course of the transaction and
prior to sale and need not occur prior to or simultaneously with the
offering. Offerees who meet the test of access (which means an employment relationship or economic bargaining power that enables the
offeree to obtain information from the issuer) must be able to request
and obtain information of the type which would otherwise be contained
in a registration statement. Thus, persons made an offering, meeting
the Ralston Purina "access to information" test, would not need to be
furnished any information by the issuer unless they request the information.
Offerings to persons who do not have such access must be made
through the use of materials which provide this information. The
"furnishing of information" requirement to "nonaccess offerees" can
be met by furnishmg the offerees the most recent annual report on
Form 10-K, and all other reports or documents required to be filed by
the issuer pursuant to sections 13, 14 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 since the end of the issuer's most recent fiscal
year, together with a brief description of the securities being offered,
the use of proceeds from the offering, and any material adverse changes
in the issuer's affairs which occurred and are not disclosed in the forms
filed.
In the event the issuer is not subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the information requirements can be met by furnishing the information required by
Schedule A of the act, with the exception that if audited financial statements are not available, unaudited financial statements may be substituted.
In addition to the access-to or providing-of-information requirements, the issuer must make available to each offeree or his offeree
representative, or both, the opportunity to obtain other information
necessary to verify the accuracy of the information furnished. The
issuer must also inform each purchaser, prior to purchase, in writing,
of the fact that the securities will be restricted as to transferability because they are unregistered securities.
Requirement 4-Number of Purchasers, 146(g)
There shall be no more than thirty-five persons who purchase, from the issuer, securities of the issuer of the same or smilar class in any consecutive twelve month period in transactions
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pursuant to the rule, or not pursuant to this rule, but otherwise
in reliance on Section 4(2) of the Act. 58
This requirement is, of course, the heart of the rule, and represents
the SEC's first official attempt to quantify the meaning of "public offering." While there may be some concern as to the SEC's authority
to impose a numerical limit, in view of the Supreme Court's language
m Ralston Purina which disavowed a quantity limit as a matter of
statutory limitation, it is likely that the SEC's statutory authority to define terms of the act is sufficiently broad to allow it to impose the
numerical limit.
For purposes of calulating the number of offerees under the thirtyfive person limitation, the issuer can exclude the following:
for cash securities of the
(a) any person who purchases .
issuer in aggregate amount of $150,000 or more, either in a
single payment or installments;
(b) any director or executive officer of the issuer;
(c) any 100% owned subsidiary of the issuer, or 100% parent of
the issuer;
(d) any bank that lends money to the issuer, if the loan is evidenced by the issuance of debt securities only;
(e) any employee or former employee of the issuer who purchases
securities pursuant to a pension, profit sharing, stock bonus,
stock option, stock purchase, or other similar plan that has
been approved by the shareholders of the issuer or its parent,
but only to the extent of thirty-five such purchasers in any consecutive twelve month period;
(f) any purchaser in a business combination, but only to the
extent of thirty-five such purchasers in any consecutive twelve
month period.5 9
Even though the above purchasers are excluded from the thirtyfive purchaser computation, all offers and sales to them must satisfy
all the other conditions of the rule.
The first four categories listed above are entirely excluded from
the "numbers" test of the rule. The last two exclusions are in the
nature of separate categories adding their own "numbers" limitation.
The exclusion relating to employee plans is self-explanatory and should
present little in the way of interpretative problems. The exclusion relating to business combinations is somewhat more complicated and ties
in with the provision of the rule concerning business combinations discussed below.
58.
59.
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Requirement 5-Business Combinations, 146(f)
A "business combination" is a reclassification, merger, consolidation, transfer of assets, exchange of securities or other similar business
reorganization. Since the demise of former Rule 133 and the adoption of Rule 145 on January 1, 1973, each person who receives a new
security in a business combination has been deemed to have been "offered and sold" the new security by the issuing business organization,
and, unless an exemption from the registration requirements of the
act is otherwise available, the new securities to be issued must be registered under the act. For example, if corporation X determines to
sell its assets to corporation Y in exchange for securities of corporation Y, each shareholder of corporation X is deemed to have purchased securities of corporation Y The proposed rule may be used to
consummate such a transaction without registration so long as there are
no more than thirty-five persons who will receive securities in the transaction and all of the conditions of the rule are met. For purposes of
this provision, the offeree representative may be an affiliate, director or
executive officer of the organization to be acquired pursuant to a business organization, and allows any such person to solicit the security
holders of the organization to be acquired for the purpose of becoming their offeree representative. A security holder of the organization to be acquired may, of course, elect not to appoint the soliciting
party his investment representative, and may elect to employ his own
investment representative at the expense of the acquired or acquiring
organization. He may also elect not to employ any investment representative and thereby prevent the rule from being available for the
business combination. The SEC recognized the problem of the "veto
power" given to each person involved in the business combination and
has solicited further comments on the rule in connection with this problem. The proposed rule recognizes the virtual impossibility of assuring
that each purchaser in a business combination will be a person able to
bear the economic risk of the investment, and consequently removes
this requirement for business combinations.
Requirement 6-Redisposition Safeguards, 146(h)

The issuer is required to take precautionary measures to assure
that he does not sell to a purchaser who takes the stock "with a view to
distribution." These measures must include placing restrictive legends on each stock certificate, issuing stop-transfer instructions to the
transfer agent, and obtaining signatures from the purchasers on "in-
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vestment letters," and may include any other appropriate means of deterring redistribution by the purchasing group.
This subsection merely requires issuers to take the same step
which the vast majority of them presently are taking in order to assure that the purchasers of the stock are not classified as underwriters.
Requirement 7-Filing, 146(i)
Forty-five days after the end of any quarter of the issuer's fiscal
year during which non-public sales are effected, the issuer must file a
statement containing information about the parties to the transaction
and the identity of the securities.
Conclusion
In view of the chaotic condition of developed case law, virtually
any SEC action which will bring a degree of certainty and predictability
into the area of private placements is a welcome relief. The rule as
presently proposed will undoubtedly work, and will probably work well.
The following thoughts are therefore more in the nature of the authors'
general observations than serious criticisms of the rule.
Is there really any need for any restrictions on the manner of offering? The term "offer" in section 2(3) of the act is broadly defined and has been even more broadly interpreted to prevent a seller
of securities from lining up potential purchasers or otherwise "conditioning the market" without the use of a statutory prospectus and then
simply closing the sale under cover of a statutory prospectus which is
unread by the purchaser. It is proper that these types of offers should
be extremely limted, when all that remains to complete the transaction is for the offeree, regardless of his financial sophistication or ability
to bear the risks of investment, to accept the offer. Where, however,
the offeree must, prior to his purchase, be shown to be financially
sophisticated and furnished information and access to other information,
including the right to ask questions directly of the issuer or persons
acting on its behalf, it is somewhat difficult to see why it makes much
difference if the offer is made by means of general advertising. Simply
put, what harm would be done by a newspaper advertisement of an
offering so long as the ultimate purchasers are in the proper class?
Closely allied to the above, why should the issuer be required to
have reasonable grounds to believe prior to making an offer that the
offeree has financial sophistication or is able to bear the economic
risk of the investment? Again, so long as the ultimate purchasers fit
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within the requirements of the rule, it is difficult to see why the offerees should all meet the requirements.
The authors' major concern as to the application of the rule, however, does not lie in those areas where compliance can be assured, but
rather in the judgment requirement that the offeree (where an offeree
representative is used) is a person who is able to bear the economic
risk of the investment. The other judgment requirement of the rulethat the offeree be financially sophisticated-has been involved in the
art of private placements for a sufficiently long period that most securities practitioners have at least a general feeling as to whether this requirement is met or not; and, in any case, the requirement is grounded
in the basic concept of the act-the evaluation of the risks of an investment. The ability of the purchaser to bear the risks of the investment
is, on the other hand, a basically new concept to the act. Where state
regulators have applied this concept, they generally furnish a specific
annual income or net worth requirement which is either met or not met
by the prospective purchaser; the federal securities practitioner has not
generally been involved in this type of evaluation. It is likely that many
mistakes will be made in tis area until experience or the courts, or
both, establish guidelines.
Finally, even though the rule is not exclusive, it seems likely that
the detailed and extensive requirements of the rule will, in themselves,
cause the rule to become the exclusive measure of the section 4(2)
exemption. It seems likely that a court, when faced with the failure
of an issuer to meet all the requirements of the rule, will view the transaction as just that-a failure to meet all the provisions of the rule. To
do otherwise would tend to negate the rule itself. The very existence
of a "checklist" or of requirements begs for compliance with that checklist. Therefore, for better or worse, private placements entered into
after adoption of the rule will, in all probability, be conducted in accordance with the rule or not at all.

